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Learn DD-WRT router isolation with a 3-network setup that separates router admin, home devices, and IoT on one router.
Most small networks are flat by default. Your laptops, phones, smart TVs, printers, cameras, and the router that controls everything often sit in environments that are far more trusting than they should be.
That works - until one weak device becomes everyone else’s problem.
In this advanced DD-WRT walkthrough, Richard Lloyd demonstrates a practical way to separate the router itself from the rest of the network, while also moving the primary home network onto a different subnet and keeping IoT devices isolated. The result is a cleaner, more defensible setup: your admin interface is no longer casually reachable from Wi-Fi or regular LAN ports, and higher-risk devices stay contained.
For small business owners, consultants, rural operators, and solo teams, this matters for a simple reason: every unmanaged device is a possible failure point. If your office printer, guest TV, camera system, or smart plug gets compromised, a flat network gives that device too much visibility. Segmentation reduces blast radius.
This article explains what the video sets up, how the configuration works, and what operational lessons are worth carrying into your own network design.
The video is part of a longer DD-WRT series, but the core problem here is easy to understand.
A default router setup usually puts everything on one network. Even if you already created a separate IoT area, the router itself may still be exposed to parts of the environment that do not need management access.
Richard’s goal is to fix that by creating three distinct zones:
192.168.1.1192.168.20.1The important shift is this: the router stops being just another reachable device on the main network. Instead, it lives in its own management-only space, accessible only through a dedicated physical port.
For many operators, that is the biggest idea in the whole video.
A lot of people stop after creating a guest network or separating smart devices. That is better than nothing, but it still leaves two common weaknesses:
If your management page can be reached from the same network as ordinary devices, then any compromised device may get the chance to probe, brute-force, exploit, or misconfigure it.
If all normal endpoints share one broad network with minimal segmentation, one infected laptop can scan others, hit file shares, or move laterally.
The video improves the first issue directly. It also creates a cleaner foundation for solving the second issue later with more segmented networks.
From a small-business perspective, this is less about paranoia and more about operational containment. A smart thermostat should not have the same network posture as your bookkeeping laptop. A guest tablet should not sit in the same space as a machine holding client files.
Here is the layout Richard builds:
192.168.1.0/24192.168.1.1192.168.20.0/24192.168.20.1That design is notable because it uses physical port assignment plus virtual bridges. In practice, that gives you a surprisingly strong form of separation on low-cost hardware.

The implementation happens mostly in the Networking section of DD-WRT.
At a high level, the process is:
That sounds straightforward, but the implications are bigger than the steps themselves.
Richard creates BR2, describing bridges as something like virtual routers. That is a useful mental model.
In consumer networking terms, a bridge here becomes a logical container for a set of interfaces that should share a network identity.
Instead of leaving the main network attached to the default bridge, he creates a separate one for the trusted client environment.
The key physical decision is to leave LAN port 1 behind on the default router bridge.
That means:
This is one of the smartest choices in the setup because it introduces a real-world control point. If someone wants admin access, they need to be physically present and plugged into the designated port.
That is not perfect security, but it is meaningful security.
Richard also moves the regular wireless interfaces into the new bridge so that Wi-Fi clients join the 192.168.20.x network instead of the admin subnet.
This matters because it avoids a common mistake: segmenting wired clients while accidentally leaving Wi-Fi management exposure in place.
Once the radios are moved, normal wireless users are effectively treated like normal LAN users on the main client network - not as potential router administrators.
BR2 gets a new address:
192.168.20.1/24That creates a new private network with the expected pool size for a small environment.
In practical terms, every device on the main LAN/Wi-Fi side now gets an address in the 192.168.20.x range, while the router admin side stays in 192.168.1.x.
That separation is the whole point. A subnet boundary is not just cosmetic. It helps define where traffic belongs and what should be routable.
Richard emphasizes the Net Isolation setting, and rightly so.
This feature is what prevents users on the client segment from directly reaching the router management network. In his testing, devices on the 192.168.20.x network could still access the internet, but attempts to load 192.168.1.1 timed out.
That is the intended behavior.
If your business uses DD-WRT in a mixed environment - office gear, personal devices, guest access, smart devices - this is one of the cleanest wins available: people can use the network without being able to touch its control plane.
A new bridge without DHCP is not much use to most client devices.
Richard adds a DHCP server entry for BR2 so clients connected to LAN ports 2–4 or the moved Wi-Fi radios automatically receive addresses on the new subnet.
This is the kind of detail that often gets missed in homemade network segmentation. Creating the bridge is not enough; devices also need:
Without DHCP, the segment may exist but feel "broken" to end users.
After saving and applying the changes, he reboots the router and verifies:
192.168.1.x192.168.20.x192.168.20.x192.168.1.1 fails from the main client segmentThat testing flow is worth copying exactly.
Too many network changes are "declared successful" before anyone verifies the actual outcomes.
The technical steps matter, but the deeper lesson is architectural:
The devices that use the network should not automatically be able to administer the network.
That principle scales well beyond homes.
For example:
Even if you never build five subnets, simply separating admin, trusted work devices, and IoT is already a serious improvement.
This configuration is especially useful for smaller organizations because they often have enterprise-like risk with consumer-grade habits.
That sounds harsh, but it is common.
A small office might have:
That is a lot of trust placed in cheap devices and default behavior.
The DD-WRT approach shown in the video helps because it offers a middle ground:
For lean operators, the real value is not novelty. It is risk reduction without a complete rebuild.
One of Richard’s strongest opinions in the video is that router administration should require plugging directly into the correct LAN port. That may sound inconvenient, but the tradeoff is intentional.
His logic is simple: if you cannot physically access that port, you should not be able to access the admin interface.
That approach makes sense in environments where:
For some users, however, there is a practical tradeoff.
For a home office or small shop, this is often acceptable. For a distributed team or unattended site, you may need a different management strategy. The video does not cover those alternatives in detail.
An easy myth to believe is that a more segmented network will feel slower or more fragile.
That is not what Richard demonstrates.
His testing shows:
That distinction matters. Good network design is not just about blocking things. It is about allowing the right traffic while denying what should never have been reachable in the first place.
Richard treats IoT as the most likely category to cause trouble, and that is a sensible assumption.
Not every smart device is insecure, but many have one or more of these issues:
His isolated IoT design aims to let those devices "call home" without giving them broad local access.
That is the right default mindset.
If a device only needs internet access to function, it does not need visibility into:
For small businesses, that same logic applies to digital signage, lobby TVs, low-cost cameras, smart locks, breakroom devices, and many printers.
Near the end of the video, Richard points out that this is not the end state. Once the router is isolated and one client network is moved off the default bridge, you have a pattern you can repeat.
That is the strategic payoff.
The moment you understand:
you can start designing around functions instead of just ports.
That could mean:
The video stops short of fully building those additional networks here, but it makes the case for modular segmentation very well.
The video is hands-on, but there are a few operational realities worth underlining.
If you move interfaces or subnets incorrectly, you may lose management access and need to reconnect carefully or reset the device.
Richard relabels interfaces clearly, which is not cosmetic. Once you create multiple bridges and DHCP scopes, bad naming leads to mistakes.
Do not assume:
Verify each one separately.
Some of the logic assumes the router was already configured in previous steps, especially the existing IoT bridge. If you are starting from a stock setup, not everything in the video maps one-to-one without that prior context.
Richard mentions configuring Wi-Fi partly for compatibility, but exact tuning choices are not the main focus of this video.
If you are a founder, office manager, or technical generalist trying to make sense of this, use this simple hierarchy:
If you never go beyond those three, you are already ahead of most small networks.
Richard Lloyd’s DD-WRT isolation method is more than a router trick. It is a strong example of a bigger principle: separate control systems from user systems, and isolate the devices you trust least.
In this configuration, the router lives on its own management subnet, accessible only through a dedicated physical port. The main home or office network moves to a different subnet with its own DHCP scope, and IoT devices remain isolated in their own segment. Internet access continues to work, but management exposure drops sharply.
For small businesses and solo operators, that is the real takeaway. Better security does not always require enterprise hardware. Sometimes it starts with a clearer network boundary, a more deliberate bridge layout, and the discipline to stop letting every device see everything.
Source: "Lock Down Your Network: Advanced Router Isolation with DD-WRT (Part 3)" - Richard Lloyd, YouTube, Jun 2, 2026 - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HlBAM_641vM
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